Aggressive Defense of All DUI Matters
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It’s no secret that police often write OUI police reports generically, using a laundry list of common OUI symptoms relating to physical appearance, driving, and field sobriety testing. Sometimes these reports are essentially templates in which a select few facts are unique to the defendant. The fictional on-size-fits-all OUI suspect almost always has the same characteristics: “a strong odor of alcohol,” “red watery eyes,” “slurred speech,” an “unsteady gait,” etc.

Obviously then, it is not unusual for these reports to contain false information and exaggerations. Because of this, booking videos and in-car cruiser camera videos can be an invaluable source of exculpatory evidence.

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Booking and cruiser videos can be extremely useful for a variety of reasons. They can reveal that you were not as drunk as the police said you were or otherwise undercut the officer’s version of the facts. They can expose flaws in your arrest experience and the administration of field sobriety tests and breathalyzers.

During the booking process, the booking officer asks a series of background questions. The suspect will be fingerprinted, and a photograph will be taken. As such, booking videos often reveal a respectful and perhaps frightened and confused person with whom a jury could readily sympathize.

As many Massachusetts police departments are now using video cameras and taping these events, it is critical for an attorney to determine whether video evidence is available and carefully review all video evidence. Under the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, exculpatory videos must be automatically produced. Some prosecutors, however, may not realize their duty to produce booking tapes, so it is important to have an attorney who will ensure that these videos are preserved and produced.

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In Massachusetts drunk driving cases, it can be useful to have a blood sample that can be compared to breathalyzer results. Recognizing this, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 263 Section 5A gives those suspected of drunk driving the right to an independent physical examination, and the police officer in charge of the station is required to inform OUI/DUI/DWI/drunk driving suspects of this right immediately upon being booked.

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The statute places the main responsibility in the hands of the suspect, and the police need not assist anyone in the exercise of this right. The police only have to provide a “reasonable opportunity,” which generally just means that they must inform suspects of this right and make a telephone available. Police have to do very little to adequately notify suspects, and sometimes they will just give a suspect an opportunity to read the statute.

This law has two purposes: (1) to provide arrested persons with the opportunity to seek potential exculpatory evidence; and (2) to prevent improper police conduct. Typically, if the police fail to inform a suspect of his/her statutory right to a physical examination, the remedy is dismissal of the complaint or suppression of evidence. However, the statute does not make the remedy explicit, and there are some very troubling loopholes that arise from the prophylactic purpose of the statute. The Appeals Court has determined that even where police fail to inform a defendant of his/her right to a physical, no sanction is required where police did not “attempt” or “desire” to undermine the purpose behind §5A. The Supreme Judicial Court has held that the remedy must only be “adequate” to cure potential or real prejudice resulting from a violation of §5A, considering whether the suspect was so drunk that compliance with the law would have been futile. Therefore, there might be no remedy for a violation of your rights where, for example, the police are otherwise occupied or even careless. A violation of your rights might be justified where someone else simply determines that it wouldn’t be worthwhile to comply with the law.

The text of M.G.L. c. 263 §5A is available at:

http://www.malegislature.gov/laws/generallaws/partiv/titlei/chapter263/section5a

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Bullcoming v. New Mexico, argued before the United States Supreme Court on Wednesday March 2, 2011, presents a question that may have important implications in Massachusetts OUI/DUI/drunk driving cases: Does a blood-alcohol test admitted without the analyst’s actual in-court testimony violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights?

Before delving into the legal issues, it is helpful to recall the facts of this case. Donald Bullcoming, a New Mexico man, was sentenced to two years in prison for an aggravated DWI, (OUI in Massachusetts). After Bullcoming refused a breath alcohol test, a search warrant issued and a blood alcohol test was performed. As the analyst who performed the blood draw was on unpaid leave at the time of trial, the prosecution introduced the blood alcohol test through a lab supervisor who had not observed or administered the test. The trial court ruled that the forensic report was a business record. The New Mexico Court of Appeals upheld that ruling and determined that there was no Confrontation Clause issue because the report was non-testimonial. As the case was pending discretionary review from the New Mexico Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court issued its Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts decision. Melendez-Diaz clarified that certificates of drug analysis are testimonial and that the prosecution may not introduce them through ex parte out-of-court affidavits without violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The New Mexico Supreme Court, applying Melendez-Diaz, held that the blood alcohol test report was testimonial but that there was no Confrontation Clause violation because “the analyst who prepared the report was a mere scrivener who simply transcribed the results…”

In his brief, Bullcoming essentially argues that: 1.) the blood alcohol test is testimonial because, like the certificates in Melendez-Diaz, law enforcement provided seized evidence to the lab to assist in the investigation, a certificate reported a certain chemical composition, and the results were presented in a formal report that was approved for use as evidence in criminal trials; and 2.) the testimony of the particular analyst who prepared the report was necessary to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.

The State’s position is that: 1.) the report is not testimonial because the information contained therein is machine-produced data, and machines are not witnesses for Sixth Amendment purposes; 2.) the report is distinguishable from the certificates in Melendez-Diaz as it is more akin to “non-adversarial public records…such as birth certificates or judgments of conviction;” 3.) if the analysis was testimonial, the requirements of the Confrontation Clause were satisfied by Bullcoming’s opportunity to confront the data and cross-examine a witness who had knowledge of the lab procedure; and 4.) any error in admission of the blood analysis was harmless.

At oral argument, much of the questioning centered on practical considerations and the possible consequences of ruling in favor of Bullcoming. From reading the transcript, it was relatively apparent that Justice Scalia agreed with Bullcoming’s position, and in a good deal of his questioning he sought to shore up the argument of Jeffrey Fisher, the attorney for Bullcoming. Scalia asked Gary King, New Mexico Attorney General, if a lab technician prepares these reports “just for fun, not for use in trial?” Scalia also suggested that the prosecution intentionally arranged for the analyst to be on unpaid leave so that he would not have to testify and would not have to be cross-examined, noting “I don’t know what the facts are, but boy, it smells bad to me…the possibility of skullduggery, even in machine–machine situations such as this, is a good reason for saying this is testimonial.”

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To read the oral argument transcript, click here:

http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/09-10876.pdf

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State Senator Robert Hedlund, a Weymouth Republican, has filed a bill designed to strengthen Melanie’s Law by requiring ignition interlock devices for six months after a first drunk driving offense. In an effort to close “loopholes,” his bill would also prohibit bundling (punishing two or more concurrent drunk driving offenses as one).

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has rated Massachusetts, which has adopted 4 of its 11 federal drunk driving recommendations, as being among the worst in the country when it comes to tough drunk driving policy. Some of the NTSB’s recommendations include a zero BAC limit for repeat offenders, impromptu alcohol screening for offenders, and a prohibition on plea bargaining. Even Senator Hedlund admitted to the Boston Herald that “some of the criteria that the NTSB looked at, might venture into areas related to civil liberties.”

It is well known that, time and again, lawmakers are influenced by the emotional pull surrounding strict OUI/DUI/drunk driving laws, and as a result, our constitutional protections are watered down. As Representative Eugene O’Flaherty, a Chelsea Democrat and House chairman on the judiciary committee, said to the Boston Globe, “The challenge is always how do you make sure that public safety is being enhanced while at the same time making sure that case law and constitutional safeguards are also protected.”
Of course, experienced Massachusetts OUI/DUI/drunk driving attorneys are always quickly alerted to any possible intrusions into these constitutional safeguards. Perhaps that is why Senator Hedlund blames the group of legislators who also work as criminal defense lawyers for rejecting measures to expand Melanie’s Law, which is already one of the most restrictive drunk driving laws in the country, in previous sessions.

To read more, see:

http://www.bostonherald.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1315715&srvc=rss
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/11/17/us_says_mass_lags_on_measures_to_deter_repeat_drunken_driving/?page=2

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In Massachusetts and many other states, individuals can be punished when, after realizing their inability to drive safely, they voluntarily pull over to sleep it off. Whether this is in the interest of public policy is highly debatable. The reasoning is that drivers who are questioning their own sobriety should not be encouraged to test their uncertainties on the roads. One the other hand, this rule is problematic and may actually encourage drunk driving.

Drivers who become aware that they are impaired might be more likely to keep driving, rather than pull over, in order to avoid potential legal consequences. They may prefer the risks of driving while impaired to the risk of law enforcement discovering them parked on the side of the road drunk or asleep.

The counter-argument is that people who have been drinking shouldn’t get behind the wheel in the first place, and that is what drunk-driving/OUI/DUI laws are designed to discourage. This is basically an all or nothing approach, and in that way it is overly idealistic. No matter what the drunk-driving laws may be, the reality is that some people will probably still continue to drive after drinking when they feel that they are sober enough to do so. It seems that if one determines at some point that he/she is not able to drive safely, there should be no question that pulling over is the best course of action, but this rule can cloud that in the minds of some individuals.

Under Massachusetts law, “operating” under the influence basically means setting the power of the vehicle in motion. You can be convicted even if you simply put the key in the ignition. In addition, when police approach a car that is pulled over on the side of the road or in a breakdown lane, the encounter may not even be considered a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes as long as the “well-being check” is reasonable and there is an objective basis for the officer to believe that a person might be in trouble. As a Massachusetts drunk-driving attorney, I can protect your rights and combat these difficult charges.

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As a Massachusetts drunk-driving defense attorney, I’d like to remind my readers of their rights (or lack thereof) when it comes to sobriety checkpoints and roadblocks. A large range of purported “lesser intrusions,” like inspections and regulatory searches have been upheld by both the United States Supreme Court and lower courts, even when they are carried out without a warrant and without the traditional measure of probable cause. Among these types of searches are sobriety checkpoints and OUI/DUI roadblocks.

In many contexts, the courts have grappled with the question of exactly which types of departures from the long-established requirement of probable cause are constitutionally allowable. With regard to sobriety checkpoints, there is a significant departure: no individualized suspicion is required at all, but there must be some neutral standard to protect the subjected individuals against arbitrariness. Michigan v. Sitz is the case in which the Supreme Court upheld sobriety checkpoints. The majority reasoned that such checkpoints are “necessary,” while the dissent was focused on citizens’ freedoms. Here in Massachusetts, our courts have adopted the same view, even though our Declaration of Rights affords greater protection than the United States Constitution in several other instances.

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As illustrated in Sitz, different normative foundations bear heavily on the rules, and I see this continuously as a Massachusetts drunk driving criminal defense lawyer. Conflicting value positions are at the heart of all criminal laws, including DUI/OUI/drunk driving laws. The theme is the tension between security and liberty. While the government has an interest in protecting individuals from the dangers of drunk -driving, civil rights are of paramount importance, and that is why I do all that I can to protect my clients from such violations.

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As a Massachusetts OUI criminal defense attorney, I wrote in April about the death of a young woman from Salem, 19-year-old Julia Gauthier, in a drunk driving accident. Gauthier was riding home from a party in a car driven by her boyfriend, Christopher Maxson, when he ran two stop signs, was clipped by another driver and flipped his SUV. The resulting accident threw Gauthier from the vehicle’s sunroof, killing her at the scene. Maxson and two other passengers suffered only minor injuries. Maxson pleaded not guilty at the time to motor vehicle homicide while driving under the influence. But on Dec. 17, Maxson changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to three to four years in state prison. The sentence was less than some of Gauthier’s family wanted, but more than the defense had hoped for.

The hearing was marked by statements from both families. Gauthier’s family read statements about her achievements and her promise in life; she was a college student when she died. Gauthier’s mother, Marie Gauthier, said she knew Maxson didn’t intend to kill her daughter and described the situation as a tragedy for both families. She said she hoped the experience would rehabilitate him. Maxson’s probation officer from a previous marijuana possession offense said he believed Maxson was open to rehabilitation and suffering from bipolar disorder. Maxson himself cried in court as his father read a letter he had written, saying he misses Gauthier and begs for forgiveness.

Read articles: Man given 3 to 4 years for fatal accident; Man gets prison for fatal crash

As a Massachusetts OUI criminal defense lawyer, I hope the probation officer is right. Maxson wrote in his letter that his feelings — missing Gauthier and knowing he’s responsible — are already “the ultimate punishment.” That doesn’t mean it’s inappropriate for the commonwealth of Massachusetts to also penalize him, but I suspect the judge took Maxson’s remorse into account when sentencing him. The maximum sentence for felony motor vehicle homicide is 15 years in prison, and Maxson’s sentence is significantly lower. However, he will likely also face a license suspension and other penalties for any OUI, not to mention the post-release consequences of a felony conviction. In fact, his accident has already been used by Salem-area high schools as an example of the terrible consequences of drinking and driving. These are very serious penalties for a young man just launching into adulthood — but I hope they help him and others avoid more fatal accidents caused by irresponsibility and mistakes.

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As a Massachusetts intoxicated driving criminal defense attorney, I am against invasive police searches of people who are merely suspected of crimes. That’s why I was disturbed by a Dec. 13 CNN article saying the federal government would like states to make blood tests mandatory for suspected DUI drivers who refuse breath tests. This “no refusal” policy was part of a U.S. Department of Transportation media blitz tied to the holiday season, when drunk driving arrests typically rise. The DoT believes refusing the breathalyzer helps some drivers escape prosecution for DUI, so it is asking states to make resources available to take blood from drivers instead. That effort would require judges on call to provide search warrants as well as personnel or training for officers in collecting blood.

Under a no refusal policy drivers are simply not allowed to decline a chemical test when intoxicated driving is suspected. When someone refuses to take a breathalyzer test, police officers would be able to call a judge who would be specially on call for this purpose. That judge would issue a search warrant, which is legally necessary to draw blood from Americans against their will. The officers would then have to bring the patient to someone trained in drawing blood, or draw the blood themselves if they have the training. In many states, state law specifies that doctors, nurses, paramedics or other medical professionals must actually draw the blood. “No refusal” strategies are currently being used in nine states, though not necessarily in every part of those nine states, and Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood says 30 states have state laws that make the policy possible.

4216248703_cd53e0cd4b_mAs a Massachusetts OUI criminal defense lawyer, I would like to remind LaHood and CNN’s readers that Americans have a Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1966 that forcible blood draws are legal, but it did not address the Fourth Amendment issue — leaving it open to a potential challenge. That decision also set standards for how police should conduct these forcible blood draws, which means drivers have the ability to challenge blood draws that don’t meet standards. In the 1966 ruling, the court said blood should be drawn in “humane and medically acceptable circumstances,” which may be why so many state laws list which medical personnel are qualified to draw blood. Police also must have probable cause to believe the driver is intoxicated. Failure to meet those standards can and does allow drivers to challenge the evidence against them, potentially undermining the entire case.

There are also practical objections to a no refusal rule. Many of them stem from the cost of meeting the legal requirements above — making qualified medical professionals and judges available whenever the police need them to handle a drunk driver. Police officers aren’t trained phlebotomists and may not be able to do the blood draw correctly — nor should they be required to learn a new job. But police agencies may not have the money to keep a nurse on call at all times, and judges may be less than pleased to be woken at 4 a.m. for a warrant.

All of this gives officers an incentive to skip steps, which raises the risk of an unnecessary injury or violation of civil rights. There is at least one report of a man left with an infection by a botched police blood draw. Drivers in other cases have complained that officers refused to listen when they warned that they had deep veins, collapsed veins or health problems making a blood draw a bad idea. And of course, blood samples have all the same chain of custody problems as breath samples, any of which could get the evidence thrown out of court. As a Massachusetts drunk driving criminal defense attorney, I think these are all important arguments against a “no refusal” law. At the very least, Beacon Hill should think carefully about whether it wants citizens literally strapped to a bed and their blood forcibly taken on the mere suspicion of an OUI.

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A recent drunk driving arrest caught my eye as a Massachusetts OUI criminal defense attorney because of the length of the driver’s previous record. As the Boston Globe reported Dec. 7, 52-year-old Vernon Perry of East Providence, RI, is facing his ninth charge of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. Perry was arrested in Seekonk in the early hours of Dec. 4 after police spotted him speeding and driving erratically. He failed field sobriety tests but refused to take a breath test, triggering an automatic suspension of his driver’s license. After he appeared in court and pleaded not guilty Dec. 6, the judge ordered him held for a dangerousness hearing, which means he can be held for up to 90 days. If convicted, he faces 2.5 to 5 years in prison, plus lifetime revocation of his driver’s license.

Despite his long record of driving drunk, Perry had a valid driver’s license when he was pulled over by Seekonk police. His eight previous OUI convictions date from 1983 to 2001. That means all of the convictions took place before Melanie’s Law, which tightened penalties for drunk driving, passed in 2005. Before Melanie’s Law, courts could not consider drunk driving convictions more than 10 years old, and drivers lose their licenses for life on a fifth OUI offense. However, that wasn’t the case in 2001, when Parry reportedly received two OUI convictions. As a result, his license was suspended for just four years.

However, a spokesperson for the RMV noted that Melanie’s Law has helped to keep Parry off the road since 2005. Because he was not eligible for license reinstatement until 2006, the spokesperson noted, the requirements of Melanie’s Law applied when he did get his license back. That law required him to drive with an ignition interlock device, at his own expense, for two years. That ended in 2008, and the RMV reportedly took the step of notifying the police in his former town, Winthrop, about his record. In the current case, Melanie’s Law will certainly apply, which means Parry is facing a mandatory two to five years in prison, plus lifetime loss of his driver’s license. He also faces a dangerousness hearing, which means he could be held without bail until trial if the court decides he is a danger to the public.

As a Massachusetts drunk driving criminal defense lawyer, I appreciate that the Globe showed that current Massachusetts OUI law does not need to be strengthened. In fact, many criminal defense attorneys felt that Melanie’s Law was too harsh in some ways. Clearly, a “lifetime lookback” for past convictions is appropriate for someone like Perry. But for people who made one isolated mistake as young adults, the “lifetime lookback” means that mistake could haunt them forever. For a second conviction, even decades later, that person could face a mandatory 30 days in jail, a two-year license suspension and a mandatory ignition interlock device after the license is reinstated. That’s a lot of penalties for two offenses at opposite ends of a person’s adult life. And as I wrote recently, the Massachusetts legislature is considering requiring the devices after one OUI, making it clear that authorities are not eager to let drunk drivers off the hook.

Most drivers I represent don’t have anything like the lengthy record Parry has. But as a Massachusetts OUI criminal defense attorney, I recommend that drivers do everything they can to keep a first OUI off their records — so they don’t end up with a string of convictions with ever-increasing consequences.

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Back in August, I wrote about the arrest of former Big Dig chief Matthew Amorello for operating under the influence of alcohol. Amorello is a former chief of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, but best known for resigning his post after part of the Ted Williams Tunnel collapsed during the Big Dig, killing a woman. He reentered the news this summer when he was arrested for operating under the influence and leaving the scene of an accident. According to reports, Amorello crashed his SUV into two parked cars in Haverhill, then drove away even though he’d lost one wheel. Authorities found his Ford Explorer parked at a Mercedes dealership with him unconscious inside. Reports in following days noted that he missed a court date because he was hospitalized.

The Boston Globe reported Nov. 30 that Amorello has arranged a kind of plea deal with the Haverhill District Court. Amorello admitted to sufficient facts to prove the OUI and leaving the scene charges, which is not quite the same as a guilty plea. Rather, it means he admits that a jury would have the facts necessary to convict him if his case went to trial. The judge in the case continued his case without a finding for a year. If Amorello can stay out of trouble for that year, the case will be dismissed.

Read article: Ex-Mass. Pike chief admits drunken driving

I’d like to discuss Amorello’s sufficient facts plea, because it’s part of my set of tools as a Massachusetts drunk driving criminal defense lawyer. Admitting sufficient facts is a lot like a guilty plea, but it could be slightly better for someone in a public service position like Amorello used to hold. A plea of sufficient facts shows up on your Massachusetts driving record just like a conviction would. However, it does not show up on a background check by any agency other than a law enforcement agency. This would allow Amorello to plead guilty and serve the sorts of penalties that a guilty plea creates, but maintain his ability to truthfully answer “no” when asked if he was ever convicted of a crime. The incident will not show up when potential employers, landlords and other non-police organizations check for a criminal background.

Often, people who admit to sufficient facts are first OUI offenders who end up sentenced to alternative disposition. As a Massachusetts OUI criminal defense attorney, I prefer this for all of my clients who are not fighting the charges, because the penalties are better for the client. Alternative disposition calls for up to two years of probation, not jail; loss of your driver’s license for 45 days, not 90 days to a year; and lower fines. That isn’t to say that alternative disposition is a light penalty or fun for the driver. For one thing, any mistake that violates probation could cancel the deal and force a guilty plea. But for drivers whose best strategy is a guilty plea, admitting sufficient facts and serving probation successfully can help them admit their mistakes and pay the penalties without allowing those mistakes to haunt them for the rest of their lives.

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